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Constructing the New International Financial
Architecture
"hat Role for the IMF?
Shalendra D.
I.

SHARMA*

INTRODUCTION

In his celebrated Manias, Panics and Crashes, Charles Kindleberger predicted an
historical average of at least one financial crisis per decade.1 Yet, in Gerard Caprio's
memorable phrase, the 1990s have been a period of "boom in busts". 2 A financial crisis
every 24 months-beginning with the speculative attacks against several currencies in
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System in 19921993, 3 followed by the sudden collapse of the Mexican peso in December 1994, and the
most recent and protracted: the Asian financial crisis that was set off when the Bank of
Thailand devalued the baht on 2 July 1997. The unexpected meltdown of the Thai
economy and the contagion (the so-called Asian flu), spread with unprecedented
ferocity, and by the end of August, the currencies of three of Thailand's neighbours,
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, had all been devalued substantially. During
September and October, the currencies of Taiwan and Singapore came under pressure,
and while both countries managed to avoid a full-blown financial crisis, both were
forced to devalue their "rock-solid" currencies. Hong Kong managed to maintain its
exchange rate peg to the US dollar, but its interest rates soared and its stock market
plunged. By early November, the crisis had spread to South Korea (the world's eleventh
largest economy), plunging it into a deep recession. Indeed, so severe was the crisis that
in a matter of weeks, Asia's high-performing "tiger economies", accustomed to annual
growth rates of between 6 and 10 percent, were reduced to "whimpering kittens". 4
Indonesia's economy (measured in real GDP) contracted by almost 15 percent in 1998,
Thailand's by 9.4 percent and Hong Kong, Malaysia, and South Korea each contracted

* Ph.D., Associate Professor and Director of MA program in Asia Pacific Studies, University of San
Francisco, sharmas@usfca.edu.
' Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (New York, Basic Books,
1989).
2 Caprio, Gerard, "Safe and Sound Banking in Developing Countries: We're Not in Kansas Anymore"
Research in FinancialServices: Private and Public Policy (1997), No. 9, pp. 79-97.
' During 1992-1993, the countries of the European Monetary System spent USS150-200 billion on
intervention in foreign exchange markets in an unsuccessful effort to stave off the devaluation of ten European
currencies. The crisis brought down the ERM, and forced the United Kingdom and Italy out of the system.
' Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed lamented that "the financial turmoil had reduced the Asian
Tigers into 'whimpering kittens' and ... that the massive damage to their economies will take decades to restore":
Singapore Straits Times, 3 March 1998, p. 11.
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by 5 to 8 percent.5 Such sharp swings in GDP are of the same order of magnitude as that
6
which occurred in the United States during the Great Depression in the 1930s.
One year later the financial contagion had spread to Russia.7 Under pressure from
the United States Treasury, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), on 20 July 1998,
approved its portion (US$ 11.2 billion) of a US$ 22.6 billion loan package to strengthen
Russia's economic programme and help stabilize the rouble.8 Although US$ 4.8 billion
was spent defending the rouble, it failed to bolster confidence in the financial markets. 9
As asset prices and foreign currency reserves continued their free fall, the government
finally devalued the rouble by 34 percent on 17 August 1998, and unilaterally
imposed controls on capital flows and a 90-day moratorium on the repayment of
Russia's foreign financial liabilities. Such arbitrary actions led to further depreciation
of the rouble, Russia's loss of access to international capital markets, a virtual collapse of
the banking sector and the accumulation of large external arrears.1" The speed of the
Russian collapse brought home the message that no country (not even a nuclear power)
was "too-big-to-fail". As investor confidence made an abrupt volte-face in perception
of sovereign risk, it triggered a new round of large-scale capital outflows from emerging
markets, including Brazil, the world's ninth largest economy (after the G-7 and China),
and the other country earlier perceived as "too-big-to-fail".
Although Brazil's ambitious inflation stabilization programme, the Plano Real
(introduced in July 1994), had made exemplary progress towards restoring price
stability, productivity growth and reducing inflation between 1994-1998 (after
decades of out-of-control inflation), it failed to adequately contain the fiscal deficit.
The fiscal deficit estimated at 8 percent of GDP in 1998 also contributed to a
widening of the external current account deficit to 4.5 percent of GDP in
1998.11 These substantial fiscal and trade deficits and the structure of public debt,
For details see IMF, IMF Annual Report: 1999 (IMF, Washington, D.C., 1999).
6 For an overview of the Asian crisis see Shalendra D. Sharma, Asia's Economic Crisis and the IMF Survival,

Vol. 40, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 27-52.
7 Several factors contributed to this. As Asian banks with losses on lending at home sold their holdings in
Russian high-yielding bonds to improve their liquidity position, it put much pressure on the rouble and on the
bond market. Overall, roughly US$ 2 billion invested by Southeast Asian businesses fled Russia. Other
contributing factors were a sharp drop in the price of gas and oil (31 percent between January and July 1998),
Russia's biggest export, an inadequate tax base, a large fiscal imbalance financed by short-term rouble denominated
debt (or GKOs). Further, the failure of the authorities to come to grips with long-standing fiscal problems and to
implement structural reforms intensified Russia's problems.
' According to one account, "Nowhere was the US influence more evident than in the decision to bail
Russia out. The Clinton administration wanted to keep President Boris Yeltsin and his so-called economic
reformers in office. The IMF staff, including Michel Camdessus and Russia expert John Odling-Smee, were
reluctant, because they worried they wouldn't be able to monitor how the money would be used. But with its
largest donor urging it to go ahead, the IMF had little choice but to agree to pledge $11.2 billion to a $22.6 billion
Russian rescue.": Deepak Gopinath, Slouching Towards a Neu, Consensus, Institutional Investor, September 1999,
p. 82. Also see, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow and Hilton Root, IMF Loans Must be Linked to
Reforms, Los Angeles Times, 9 April 1999, p. 27; and IMF Survey, Vol. 27, No. 17, 31 August 1998, pp. 275-276.
9 Some have argued that the rejection by the Duma (Russian Parliament) to accept key fiscal measures in the
modified economic program worked out by the IMF and the Russian government in early July was the last straw.
See Andrei Illarionov, The Roots of the Economic Crisis,Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1999, pp. 68-82.
10 The devaluation exposed the insolvency of the banks by leaving them with dollar obligations on forward
contracts many times greater than their capital. For details see IMF Survey, Vol. 28, No. 15, 2 August 1999, pp.
241-243; IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1999, pp. 55-58 (advance copy available on the internet at www.imf.org).
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which makes the government's finances extremely sensitive to changes in short-term
interest rates and the exchange rate, made Brazil highly vulnerable to changes in
investor sentiment-in particular, the widespread sentiment in financial markets that
Brazil's crawling peg was simply not sustainable. To stem the huge outflows of US$
12 billion in August and another US$ 19 billion in September 1998, the Brazilian
authorities increased official interest rates to 43 percent and announced several fiscal
measures, including substantial spending cuts, to stabilize the real.1 2 However, this
only brought temporary relief. By late September, Brazil's foreign reserves had
dwindled to US$ 45 billion, below the level of its short-term debt. As the real came
under renewed pressure, the Brazilian government sought external assistance. In
November the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced a US$ 41.5 billion
multilateral loan package (with the IMF contributing US$ 18.1 billion under a threeyear Stand-By Arrangement), to sustain the value of the real and help Brazil with its
balance of payments problem. 13 However, failure to reach political agreement on the
fiscal adjustment programme prevented congressional approval and further
undermined investor confidence. Market concerns were immediately reflected in
increased capital outflows, and spreads on Brazil's external debt rose to approximately
1,000 basis points.14 By early January 1999, Brazil had about US$ 36 billion in
reserves compared to US$ 70 billion in August 1998. The Standard and Poor's ratings
agency downgraded Brazil's foreign debt rating, and the Bovespa, Brazil's leading
stock index, fell by 27 percent in a week. As reserves continued to decline, the
government was forced to abandon its exchange rate policy and float the beleaguered
real on 15 January 1999, just two weeks after President Cardoso's second
inauguration.15
For the G-7 nations and its OECD partners, acting in concert with the IMF, the
World Bank and other multilateral financial institutions, "managing" the crises has
been both frustrating and extremely costly. 16 If the Mexican rescue package cost an
unprecedented US$ 52 billion (with the IMF and the United States contributing US$
17 billion and US$ 20 billion respectively), 17 between August 1997 to December 1998,
the G-7 and its partners had already pledged just over US$ 200 billion to support
Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, Russia and Brazil, with the IMF contributing an
" See IMF Survey, Vol. 27, No. 23, 14 December 1998; and Rudiger Dornbusch, Brazil's Incomplete
Stabilization and Reform, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1, 1997, pp. 367-401.
12 IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1999, p. 49.
13 For details, see IMF Survey, Vol. 27, No. 21, 16 November 1998; IMF Survey, Vol. 27, No. 23,
14 December 1998; IMF Survey, Vol. 28, No. 6, 22 March 1999.
14 Also, on 6 January 1999, when Itamar Franco, governor of the state of Minas Gerais, announced a
moratorium on debt payments owed to the federal government (totalling US$ 15 billion), market confidence in
the success ofBrazil's fiscal stabilization plan waned further. And, when a number of other Brazilian states joined
the request of Minas Gerais, the net outflow of capital intensified.
iS Almost immediately, the real lost over 40 percent of its value. For details, see IMF Survey, Vol. 28, No. 3,
8 February 1999.
16 The G-7 (or Group of 7) countries include the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, France,
Canada and Italy. The OECD countries include the G-7 plus 15 other major economies of the world.
17 The US$ 20 billion was funded through a conditional collateralized loan funded from the US Treasury's
Exchange Stabilization Fund.
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unprecedented US$ 65.3 billion.' 8 This amount does not include the additional US$
30 billion pledged by Japan under the Miyazawa Initiative. 9 However, despite the
huge infusion of capital, the World Bank's December 1999 issue of Global Economic
Prospects notes that "the effects of the crises of 1997-1999 from East Asia, to Russia and
Brazil persist in many aspects. In most developing countries growth remains weak and
well below pre-crisis levels".

20

The frequency and severity of the crises, the enormous size of the rescue
packages, and the realization that such bailouts could not be continued indefinitely
finally forced a "reality-check" on the complacent G-7 leaders. President Clinton, who
in November 1997 dismissed Asia's financial woes as "a few small glitches in the road",
a few months later characterized the "Asian/global crises as the greatest financial
challenge facing the world in the last half century". 2' The urgent task facing the global
community, President Clinton, the other G-7 leaders, their finance ministers and
senior bureaucrats now argued, was to fix the potential flaws and to create a more
equitable, sustainable and stable international financial and monetary system. 22 Their
collective esprit de corps was lucidly captured by the self-effacing, former United
States Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, who in his inimitable manner stated that the
task before the global community was to construct a "new international financial
architecture" that is "as modern as the markets" .23
Rubin's pithy epigram has generated a veritable cottage industry. An evergrowing list of "architects" have come up with proposal after proposal on how to
reform the existing regime and construct a new international financial architecture.
Indeed, collaborative initiatives have already been unveiled to reduce susceptibility to
18 Prior to Mexico, the largest IMF stand-by credit arrangement was the US$ 4 billion agreement with the
United Kingdom in 1977. It is important to note that while the IMF and other multilateral institutions provided
the rescue packages to ailing Asian economies quickly, the amount and timing of disbursements depended on the
countries' performance under IMF agreed reform programmes. Between August 1997 and October 1998,
Thailand received some 60 percent of the financing committed for that period by the IMF and the World Bank.
Korea received almost 90 percent of financing committed in the very early stages of the crisis. By contrast, official
lending to Indonesia was held up after an initial disbursement of US$ 3 billion in early November 1997, owing to
the slow implementation of reforms. IMF disbursements resumed only in May 1998 and were stepped up during
the summer after major political reforms took place in the country. For details on IMF lending see IMF Survey,
Vol. 28, No. 5, 8 March 1999.
19 The Miyazawa Initiative, announced in October 1998, aimed to aid affected countries restructure
corporate debt, reform financial systems, strengthen the social safety net, increase employment and ease business'
financial constraints. While the massive injection of capital has slowed the downward spiral, and while there are
signs of recovery in some of the hard-hit economies, it is premature to pronounce the crisis over. As of mid-1999,
a third of the world's economies were either in recession or experiencing markedly slow growth, and unlike the
Mexican peso crisis, recovery this time will most likely be slow and incremental. For an excellent overview see
IMF, World Economic Outlook: May 1999 (IMF, Washington, D.C., 1999).
20 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries: 2000 (World Bank, Washington, D.C.,
1999) pp. 1-2.
21 Quotes cited in CPER Conference Report, No. 6. Financial Crises in Asia (London, Centre for Economic
Policy Research, 1998) p. 2; and Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations, Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System: The Future International Financial Architecture (New
York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1999) p. 23.
22 At the Birmingham summit in May 1998, the G-7 leaders and finance ministers stressed the need for
reforming the international monetary system.
23 Robert Rubin, "Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System", public statement
delivered at the Brookings Institution, 14 April 1998.
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financial crisis, and to deal with it more effectively when and where it occurs. While
there is broad consensus on the "motherhood and apple-pie" issues, such as the need
to strengthen the global financial system via more intensive surveillance and
monitoring of capital markets and country financial sectors (in particular, the banking
system), timely dissemination of financial information under internationally agreed
standards, and greater transparency in both public and private sector activity
(including greater private sector burden-sharing in order to eliminate, or at least keep
within permissible limits, the problems associated with "asymmetric information" and
"moral hazard"), there is also much disagreement. 24 Currently, policy-makers,
financial analysts, academic economists and others are engaged in intense debates
regarding the merits of capital controls, fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes,
and "dollarization", amongst other issues. Without doubt, the most contentious issue
has to do with the role of the IMF. This article provides an overview and critically
analyses the debates. Contrary to its many critics, it argues that the IMF's role must be
enhanced. Given its institutional resources, administrative capacity, worldwide
membership, broad experience and technical and policy competence, the IMF can
play an important role in co-ordinating global economic integration and crisis
management.
II.

THE

IMF

AND ITS CRITICS

To critics, the IMF is a Bretton Woods relic incapable of playing a constructive
role in the building of the new international financial architecture. 2 While its
harshest critics want the IMF altogether abolished, others are prepared to live with a
severely restricted institution with limited powers and resources. Still, some others
have proposed alternatives to the IMF. Among those calling for the IMF's immediate
shutdown is the former US Secretary of State, George Schultz, former Treasury
secretary, William Simon, and the former chairman and CEO of Citicorp/Citibank,
Walter Wriston. The trio argue that "the IMF's promise of massive intervention has
spurred global meltdown of financial markets [and that] the IMF is ineffective,
unnecessary and obsolete and should be abolished". Similarly, Robert Barro argues
that "the IMF can best help the global economy by declaring itself insolvent and
going out of business" and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman blames the IMF's huge

24 Moral hazard refers to a situation where someone can reap the rewards from their actions when things go
well, but does not suffer the full consequences when things go badly. Hence, investors do not have to exercise due
diligence since they would expect a bailout in the case of default, or for that matter, debtor countries can choose
to pursue risky economic policies with the expectation that they will not have to pay the full costs of their debts
and investors will not lose the full amount invested if a financial crisis occurs. In the case of the Mexican peso
crisis, it was argued, the IMF, by cushioning the losses of imprudent lenders and borrowers with generous
"bailout" packages, only encourages reckless behaviour in the future. Asymmetric information emerges when one
party to a financial contract does not have the same information as the other party.
25 The IMF, along with the World Bank, was established at Bretton Woods in 1944 to supervise the operation
of the system of fixed exchange rates. This system ended in 1971.
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bailout packages for "helping to exacerbate the Asian crisis" and calls for its
26
dissolution.
To these critics the IMF's most egregious fault is that its policies (in particular, its
large rescue packages) undermine market discipline by promoting moral hazard. It is true
that bailout packages have allowed errant private creditors (especially big commercial
banks) to escape from bad lending decisions at relatively little cost. 27 It is also true that
financial intermediaries in Asia enjoyed both explicit and implicit government
guarantees in case of default (and therefore undertook excessively risky ventures based
on the highest possible return rather than expected values), just as creditors ignored
information about weak supervisory structures in debtor countries. Yet, the widespread
perception that the IMF bailed out all foreign and domestic investors is incorrect. Private
creditors (mostly European and Japanese banks) have taken large losses and have had to
lengthen the maturities of their claims, and bondholders and equity investors have
sustained huge losses in Asia. One recent study has estimated that foreign equity investors
as a group suffered potential losses of roughly US$ 240 billion from the Asian and
Russian crises, and the corresponding figures for foreign banks and bondholders were
US$ 60 billion and US$ 50 billion respectively. Between June 1997 and January 1998,
28
US investors are estimated to have lost about US$ 30 billion on Asian equities alone.
Moreover, the moral hazard risk must be balanced against a more deadly financial
implosion of the monetary system and systemic spill-over risks and meltdown, and the
heavy socio-economic costs of inaction.2 9 By providing emergency assistance to illiquid
but not insolvent borrowers, the IMF prevented costly defaults by avoiding driving
previously solvent institutions into bankruptcy and thereby limiting risk to the financial
system as a whole. After all, we know from the hands-off strategy during the 1980s debt
crisis (where creditors and debtors were left to sort out their problems) that inaction can
greatly aggravate the problem. Finally, the assumption that only IMF policies create
moral hazard is simplistic. Financial crises, more often than not, reflect misjudgments or
"irrational exuberance" and, as Mishkin carefully argues, "asymmetric information
problems" that lead investors and banks to underestimate the risks in emerging markets
and then to overreact when sentiment begins to change.3" Given these contexts, calls to
abolish the IMF is akin to declaring that the US Federal Reserve "should no longer be
26 See George P. Schultz, William Simon and Walter Wriston, Who Needs the IMF Hoover Digest, 1998, No.
2, pp. 7-9; Milton Friedman, Flow Asia Fell, Hoover Digest, No. 2, 1999, pp. 1-4; and Robert J. Barro, How the
IMF Starts Fires it's Supposed to Put Out, Hoover Digest, 1999, No. 3, pp. 1-4. See also Anna Schwartz, Time to
Terminate the ESF and the IMF CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 48, 26 August 1998 (Washington,
CATO Institute, 1998).
27 For example, the Mexican rescue package allowed holders of Mexican government securities (tesobonos) to
get out with little cost.
28 Institute of International Finance, Report of the Working Group on Financial Crises in Emerging Markets
(Washington, D.C., January 1999). Also Bong-Chan Kho and Rene Stulz, Banks, the IMF and the Asian Crisis,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series, No. 7361, September 1999.
29 The collapse of a relatively small US hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, in August 1998, and
the threat of it bringing down a much wider circle of financial institutions, is illustrative. The Federal Reserve
moved in time to prevent the contagion.
1o ES. Mishkin, The Causes and Propagation of Financial Instability: Lessons for Policymakers in C. Hakkio (ed.),
Maintaining FinancialStability in a Global Economy (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1997), pp. 55-96.
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allowed to lend money during bank runs"-an idea that is "irresponsible" and has
31
serious implications for the global economy.
Sebastian Edwards also wants to abolish the IMF. 32 He argues that the Asian
financial crisis revealed that the Fund is a secretive, top-down, meddlesome, highly
bureaucratized, profligate behemoth that has great difficulty in responding quickly to
crises and implementing even the most modest reforms. To Edwards, "what is needed
is a set of new, small and efficient multilateral institutions" that can "provide
information and act quickly to avert crises". Edwards proposes the creation of three
new small and efficient entities with defined responsibilities to replace the IMF. First, a
Global Information Agency to provide timely and uncensored information on each
country's financial health, including the publishing of public ratings of domestic
financial systems and the issue of red alerts when countries fail to provide adequate
information. Second, a Contingent Global Financial Facility to provide contingent
credit lines to countries that, although solvent, face temporary liquidity problems. To
be eligible, these countries would have to meet some minimum standards of
disclosure and transparency. And third, a Global Restructuring Agency to provide
conditional lending and policy advice to crisis countries. However, Edwards' proposal
has the potential to create an even larger bureaucracy with co-ordination and
duplication problems. Imagine a scenario where the relatively autonomous agencies,
one setting standards for transparency and disclosure and one with little say over the
nature of these standards, conditioning its lending on them. This would make the
current co-ordination problems between the IMF, the World Bank and other
multilateral agencies seem minor.
In his provocative book, financier George Soros has argued that the international
financial markets are "coming apart at the seams" creating "a crisis of global
capitalism". 3 3 He claims that since the private sector has proven to be ill-suited to
allocate international credit, it is time to create a publicly funded "international credit
insurance corporation". Under this system, borrowing countries would underwrite the
cost of insurance by paying a fee when floating loans, and lenders could buy insurance
against default. The idea is that "good" borrowers (those with transparent financial
systems), would be able to borrow at lower rates. The Fund would set limits on how
much each country could borrow and insure investors against debt default, while
shielding solvent borrowers from insolvency contagions (since the Asian contagion
wreaked havoc on solid borrowers). It is not clear how the IMF would determine
limits on how much could be loaned, or what the appropriate insurance fee would be.
Soros will have to provide more specifics for his global central bank (although he does
" Paul Krugman, The Indispensable IMF in Lawrence J. McQuillan and Peter C. Montgomery, The
International Monetary Fund: Financial Medic to the World (Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1999)
pp. 200-202. Suffice it to note, the moral hazard argument can be applied on a variety of levels, including the IMF,
governments and companies. That is, if we do not need the IMF internationally, should we then not have lenders
of last resort domestically. More specifically, should we abolish our national deposit insurance schemes?
32 Sebastian Edwards, Abolish the IMF Financial Times, 13 November 1998, p. Al.
33 George Soros, The Crisisof Global Capitalism (Boston, Little Brown, 1998).
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not use the term). As it stands now, Soros' idea of an international public insurance
corporation seems to be a non-starter.
Jeffrey Garten, Dean of the Yale School of Management, advocates the creation of
a global central bank with responsibility for overseeing a new global currency and with
wide-ranging powers to engage in market operations by purchasing the government
securities of its members when they get into financial difficulties. Its operations would
be financed by credit lines from national central banks or drawn from a modest tax on
international merchandise transactions and/or selected global financial transactions.
Moreover, it would enjoy oversight powers over banks and other financial institutions,
establish uniform standards for lending, and be accountable to a committee of
governors drawn from the G-7 and eight rotating emerging-market members. Garten
writes:
"A global central bank could provide more money to the world economy when it is rapidly
losing steam. For example, it could buy the bonds of the Central Bank of Brazil, thereby
injecting hard currency into that country when it most needs the help (like right now). It would
have the ability to buy a country's debt at steep discounts, a crucial need now because in
countries like Thailand and Venezuela debts are piling up and preventing new lending and new
34
investment.

Garten's global central bank faces two difficult challenges. First, it is not clear if
the credits extended by national central banks would be sufficient, and second, the
question of how much authority national central banks would cede (or whether they
will be willing at all) to a global central bank, and how this political and economic
obstacle would be overcome, remains unresolved.
Finally, Henry Kaufman has proposed the creation of a single super-regulator-an
"international credit-rating agency"-with broad supervisory and regulatory powers
over financial markets and institutions, including the capacity to enforce common
prudential standards on financial institutions, and monitor the performance of financial
institutions and markets. 35 Like Garten's proposal, Kaufman's is short on specifics. It
does not spell out the standards or specify how greater transparency and risk
management would be enforced. What is clear is that no national government will be
willing to cede so much power and sovereignty to international regulators or
supervisors. As Barry Eichengreen has aptly noted, at a time when there is little interest
in creating new supranational bodies with the power to usurp the traditional
prerogatives of nation states, what "such proposals have in common is their
'36
impracticality. They have not a snowball's chance in hell of being implemented.
Surprisingly, one of the IMF's sternest critics, Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs,
prefers reforming the Fund, rather than abolishing it. Sachs asserts that the IMF's

4 Jeffrey Garten, In This Economic Chaos, a Global Bank can Help, International Herald Tribune, 25 September
1998, p. 8.
'5

36

Henry Kaufman, Preventing the Next Financial Global Crisis, Washington Post, 28 January 1998, p. A17.
Barry Eichengreen,

Towards A New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda

(Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1999) p. 9.
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unimaginative "one model fits all prescriptions actually made Asia's financial turmoil
worse". 37 He argues that the problems in Asian economies were "far from fatal". To the
contrary, the economies had deep strengths, such as high rates of savings, budget
surpluses, flexible labour markets and low taxation. Hence, "there is no fundamental
reason for Asia's financial calamity except financial panic itself'. In effect, "the crisis is a
testament to the shortcomings of international capital markets and their vulnerability to
sudden reversals of market confidence". This problem was made worse by the Fund's
callous overdose of unnecessary conditions: notably, pressing beleaguered governments
to raise their existing budget surpluses still higher and to tighten domestic bank credit
by increasing interest rates, including the imprudent closing down of several weak (but
viable) banks. To Sachs, such ill-advised policies only served to prolong asset-price
deflation in real estate and further erode investor confidence. This resulted in the
"stampede mentality" with further capital flight and economic contraction.
While there is truth in some of Sachs' criticism, especially in the context of South
Korea, 38 the reality is too complex for such generalized criticisms. We now know that
these "miracle" Asian economies were not simply mere victims of the sharp shifts in
capital flows, but suffered from serious financial sector weaknesses and externalimbalance problems, not to mention non-existent prudential supervision and
regulation-a direct result of pervasive crony capitalism. Also, to set the record
straight, when Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia approached the IMF, they already
had perilously low reserves, and the Indonesian rupiah was excessively depreciated.
Under these circumstances the first order of business was to restore confidence in the
currencies. To achieve this, interest rates had to be temporarily increased, even if
higher interest costs complicate the situation of weak banks and corporations. Once
confidence is restored, interest rates can return to more normal levels. Yet, as Sachs
asks, why not operate with lower interest rates and a greater devaluation? The answer
is simple-the level of devaluations was already excessive.
Reinforcing Sachs' critique, Martin Feldstein has argued that the IMF's intrusive
policies greatly aggravated the Asian crisis. 39 Instead of focusing on balance-ofpayments adjustment, the IMF stepped out of bounds (since its charter provides no
such mandate) when it began to arbitrarily meddle in the domestic economic affairs of
sovereign countries. Insisting on structural reforms which lie beyond its traditional
competence in macroeconomic adjustment, the Fund's misguided domestic structural
and institutional reforms measures had adverse consequences, turning a temporary
liquidity problem into a country-wide and later region-wide financial meltdown.
37 Quotes are from Jeffrey Sachs, The Wrong Medicine for Asia, New York Times, 3 November 1997;
The IMF: Power Unto Itself, Financial Times, 11 December 1997; and Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, The
East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, 1998,
pp. 1-74.
38 There is agreement that South Korea got into trouble in mid-1997 because its financial sector had incurred
short-term foreign debts that far exceeded its foreign exchange reserves. Korea's problem was one ofunsustainable
corporate debt and the resultant temporary illiquidity rather than insolvency. In such a context the IMF's demand
for a fundamental restructuring of the Korean economy was not very prudent.
3 Martin Feldstein, Refocusing the IMF Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 2, March/April 1998, pp. 20-33.
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Feldstein notes that Asian economies had prospered for decades despite the structural
problems in their economies, and the IMF's intrusive measures (which included
among other things "specifying in minute detail such things as the price of gasoline and
the manner of selling plywood"), were not a prerequisite to economic recovery. It is
not difficult to argue that the IMF went overboard in its demands, especially in
Indonesia where the Fund's demands skyrocketed from 15 bullet points in November
1997 to 50 bullet points by the time the second deal was signed on 14 January 1998, to
115 bullet points by the third deal in April 1998.
However, there were equally compelling reasons as to why the IMF opted for
the so-called radical surgery. The prevalent view within the Fund was that in this era
of high capital mobility and market integration, it was impossible to fix the
international financial system without simultaneously fixing the domestic
microeconomic structures of crisis-affected countries. Hence, stabilizing a country's
financial system necessitated institutional reforms that extended well beyond the
traditional monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies. There was also concern that
since the market now knew about the pervasive structural problems, would market
confidence be regained without the affected countries agreeing to implement
transparent auditing and accounting practices, improve corporate governance and
reform (if not dismantle) their shaky banks, finance companies and government
monopolies? Suffice it to note, without the IMF's determined intervention, it was
highly unlikely that Thailand and Indonesia would close their insolvent banks and
finance companies or that South Korea would rein in its greatly over-leveraged and
out of control chaebols, or for Indonesia to dismantle the corruption-ridden and
inefficient government monopolies in plywood and clove.
The criticism that the IMF's unduly contractionary macroeconomic policies (i.e.
its insistence on reduced spending, high taxes and higher interest rates to limit currency
depreciation, together with the closure of banks and finance companies) were directly
responsible for the bankruptcy of otherwise viable firms, inflation and overall
economic slowdown, is debatable. The failure of the currency and equity markets to
make the expected quick recovery seems to indicate that the Fund's policies may have
made the contraction deeper than necessary. Also, there is some evidence that the bank
closures were carried out in an ad hoc manner, ignoring issues such as deposit insurance,
thereby leading to panic withdrawals of funds and undermining investor confidence.
However, the banking problem provided no easy solutions and the Fund had a tough
call on its hands. The Asian economies needed to avoid further devaluations and
sustain capital inflows to finance their current-account deficits and their large stock of
short-term debt (much of it denominated in foreign currency). It is well known that
once the market loses confidence in a currency, raising interest rates is the only way to
support the currency. In regard to bank closure, Sachs' claim that the IMF's "illconceived" closure of banks worsened the crisis is simply wrong. For example, prior to
the crisis, Indonesia had anywhere between 270 to 300 banks and finance companies.
The evidence indicates that the IMF closed only 16 banks. In hindsight, a compelling
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argument can be made that it should have closed even more.40 Further, the IMF
cannot be placed in a position of providing large-scale funds without ensuring that
banks have prudent policies in place. Such open-ended commitments are neither
credible nor desirable.
In the light of this complex and difficult background, what grade the Fund gets in
dealing with the Asian crisis depends much on the analytical and normative biases of the
observer. However, if the real measure of success is based on the actual performance,
namely, did the IMF-led rescue packages help restart plummeting economies, then the
IMF should be awarded a B+. A recent comprehensive study shows that South Korea
and Thailand, which have on the whole been rather successful in implementing the
IMF-led programmes, have made favourable economic recovery. 4 Large parts of the
economy have stabilized, inflation has fallen sharply and their external position has
greatly improved. On the other hand, Indonesia, in part due to the political uncertainty
and failure to implement the IMF-sponsored reforms, still faces significant hurdles.
III.

THE

IMF:

BUILDING CAPACITY

While there is broad consensus that the world needs some sort of an institution to
mitigate recurrent financial crises, it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel to achieve
this goal. Instead of abolishing the IMF, or creating entirely new superstructures, the
most prudent is to strengthen the IMF. Thankfully, this fact has not been lost. The
United States, the G-7 Executive Directors of the IMF, and the G-22 group of nations
2
(the G-7 and G-22 are the major shareholders of the IMF and World Bank),
acknowledge that the IMF is an important partner and want the institution to play a
central role in constructing the global financial architecture. In October 1998, the
United States Congress finally approved some $ 18 billion in much-needed new
funding for the IMF. As US Treasury Secretary, Larry Summers recently noted,
"events have reaffirmed that the IMF is indispensable. All of us involved with global
finance would be breathing less easily this holiday season if the IMF had not taken the
43
steps that it did in response to the crises in Asia and elsewhere.

"' Lest we forget, Thai banks were permitted to wait for up to two years before reporting non-performing
loans, while the Indonesian banks did not have to do any such reporting at all.
41 See Timothy Lane, Atish R. Ghosh, et al., IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand: A
PreliminaryAssessment (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, Preliminary Copy, 1999).
42 The IMF's purpose is to promote international monetary co-operation, exchange rate stability and the
expansion of international trade by serving as a short-term lender, providing liquidity for member countries with
short-term balance of payment problems. On the other hand, the World Bank role is to provide longer-term
development finance. Although the total size of the IMF's quotas increased from about US$ 9 billion at its creation
in 1944 to nearly US$ 200 billion in 1997, it has declined relative to almost all
relevant global economic indicators,
whether the size of world trade, international reserves, or international financial flows.
" Lawrence Summers, "The Right Kind of IMF for a Stable Financial System", presentation at the London
School of Business, UK, 14 December 1999 (www.ustreas.gov/press/release/ps294.htm). The US is the one of
the IMF's major financial backers with a quota or "membership fee" that accounts for roughly 18 percent of the
total IMF funds. The quota also determines its "drawings" or voting power and borrowing capacity.
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While enhancing the IMF capacities will be incremental, over the past several
months progress has been made in strengthening the Fund and addressing some of the
problem areas identified by the critics. First, the Fund, along with the World Bank, the
regional development banks and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, are to
work on all aspects of improving the banking system, including the carrying out of
more intensive surveillance of the financial sectors of member countries and helping
members develop the supervisory and regulatory frameworks in conformity with
international standards. 4 Top priority is to be given to reforming the banking sector in
emerging market economies by developing standards (in line with the international
standards outlined in the Basle Committee's Core Principles for Banking Supervision)
in banking supervision, accounting and disclosure, auditing and valuation of bank
assets, and in corporate governance.
Second, there is now agreement that the IMF, in collaboration with other
institutions such as the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements,45
should closely monitor developments in the global capital markets by keeping a
watchful eye on: the risks of potential large reversals of capital flows and the contagion
effects; the rapid accumulation of short-term debts; unhedged exposure to currency
fluctuations; and the impact of selective capital account liberalization. Moreover, in
order to prevent a private debt problem rapidly turning into a sovereign debt problem,
measures are to be devised to make capital flows less volatile, the exchange rate regimes
more realistic, and domestic asset prices better at reflecting the actual underlying
46
returns and risks.
Third, the Fund is to actively encourage member countries to adopt the IMF's
Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, and disseminate reliable, timely and
comprehensive fiscal and monetary data, both to the IMF and market participants, by
subscribing to the Fund's General Data Dissemination System (GDDS) and the Special
Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS). The SDDS has already been amended to
include data on reserve-related contingent liabilities, and to provide better coverage of
the foreign liquidity position of the corporate and government sectors. Countries
subscribing to the SDDS will need to be in full compliance by March 2000.
Fourth, in response to the charges that the IMF's policies encourage moral hazard,
the Fund is to consider ways to increase private sector involvement in crisis prevention
and especially in burden-sharing, thereby limiting the "exit-option" that removes
private sector credit from a distressed economy at the very time the official
41 It was recognized that the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision will continue to take responsibility
for formulating banking and supervision standards, while the IMF's primary role will be to monitor the adoption
and implementation of these standards during its regular Article IV surveillance work.
" The Bank for International Settlements, an international institution based in Basle, Switzerland, acts as a
kind of central bankers' bank.
46 There was recognition that the monitoring of international capital flows had to be improved. This meant
that much better data had to be made available. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data, which provided
some of the best data on short-term international capital flows, was available only twice a year with a six-month
lag. Hence, a foreign exchange crisis could arrive and depart vell before these data could even provide a warning
sign. It was agreed that the BIS move towards a quarterly data system, with a one-month lag.
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governmental and multilateral financial community (e.g. the IMF) are being called
upon to inject large doses of public resources.
Fifth, in April 1999, the IMF's Executive Board agreed to provide Contingent
Credit Lines (CCL) to member countries. The CCL is an addition to another financial
instrument, the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), established at the end of 1997.
The SRF is intended for use by member countries already in crisis or facing
exceptional balance-of-payments outflow due to short-run speculative attacks. The
CCL is intended as a precautionary measure for countries with fundamentally strong
policies, but which are at risk of possible contagion.
Sixth, the IMF and other multilateral financial institutions, in consultation with
donor and recipient country members, are to design programmes that take better
account of the broader structural and institutional environment within which they are
implemented. There is to be a greater focus on reforms to reduce trade barriers and
unproductive or "market-distorting" expenditures, promote core labour standards and
to mitigate the social costs of economic adjustments.
Seventh, there is broad consensus that the IMF-an institution with tremendous
clout in the global economy that is underwritten by the world's taxpayers-should not
operate behind a wall of secrecy. The IMF has been instructed to move "significantly"
towards openness and transparency by the G-7. Specifically, the Fund is now to release
a broad array of information on its policies, programmes and objectives, including a
more comprehensive summary of countries' accounts with the Fund and all
outstanding loans. The establishment of the IMF website (www.imf.org) has already
increased accessibility. Currently, users can access a wealth of institutional information
and data, including members' financial positions vis-a-vis the Fund, numerous letters of
intent, Policy Framework papers, speeches by management, the IMF publications
database and full texts of hundreds of IMF publications. All of these developments
augur well for the future of the international financial and monetary system.
IV.

THE

IMF:

AN INTERNATIONAL LENDER OF LAST RESORT?

More than a century ago, Walter Bagehot explained that a financial system
requires a lender of last resort to assist financial institutions in a liquidity crisis.4"
Bagehot distinguished between liquidity and solvency and provided rules that separated
the two. He argued that in a crisis, the lender of last resort should lend freely, at a
penalty rate, on the basis of collateral that is marketable in the ordinary course of
business when there is no panic. 48 The collateral requirement separates insolvent from
illiquid financial institutions. Banks, in particular, are vulnerable to runs because they
" Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (New York, Wiley, 1999) (originally
published in 1873). Bagehot, of course, was thinking of the Bank of England to act as the lender of last resort to
avert the liquidity crises afflicting the city of London in the early nineteenth century. Bagehot argued that the
lender of last resort should provide cash without limit to solvent borrowers at a penal rate of interest.
18 That is, the collateral should be valued at pre-panic prices.
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issue highly liquid short-term liabilities. The penalty rate eliminates subsidies, reduces
moral hazard, and reduces reliance on the lender. In a national setting, governments
(usually a central bank), generally opt for providing lender-of-last-resort facilities
because the public costs of a banking panic are large and because the private sector is
unable to fulfil this role since lenders cannot quickly determine how a given shock will
affect individual institutions. To limit moral hazard and the use of these facilities, the
authorities impose supervisory and regulatory standards and require, through partial
deposit insurance and capital adequacy standards, that the private sector shares the cost
of risk-taking. Moreover, since a domestic lender of last resort usually has regulatory
authority over the commercial banks to which it lends, it can actually increase the
supply of domestic money through its operations (e.g., by emitting additional currency
to buy government securities). Analysts credit the development of lender-of-last-resort
49
facilities for reducing the frequency and severity of national banking crises.
If a lender of last resort is necessary in a domestic context, isn't an analogous
institution necessary at the international level to resolve collective action problems?
Despite quota increases and the creation of instruments such as the New Arrangements
to Borrow (i.e. the SRF and CCL), the Fund's resources are still minuscule when
compared to the sheer volume of private global capital flows. Moreover, the IMF still
cannot lend freely (since it cannot create hard currencies) nor quickly (since it must get
member approval of, and borrower agreement to, its conditional loan programmes).
Given these constraints, some prefer that the IMF should stop pretending to be a
lender of last resort and get out of the lending business, allowing private markets to
distribute liquidity to solvent financial institutions.50 However, most observers agree
that the world needs an international lender of last resort, although there is less
agreement on who the lender should be and how the lender should operate.
Allan Meltzer has argued that the IMF should be replaced by a "true lender of last
resort", 5 He claims that unlike the IMF, a true lender of last resort must employ
Bagehot's classic rule: never to subsidize borrowers. Rather, a lender of last resort must
lend freely, to temporarily illiquid but solvent financial institutions, at penalty rates and
matched by the borrower's best collateral. Deepak Lal argues that the IMF should not
serve as a lender of last resort because it cannot distinguish between an illiquid bank
and an insolvent bank. Lal notes:
"The IMF can lend only after lengthy negotiations with a country's government and with the
approval of its board. It has no way of sorting out the 'good' from 'bad' loans, for instance made
by foreign banks to residents in the country, and to liquidate the latter. The lender of last resort
function for the money center banks involved in foreign lending must therefore continue to be
5 2
provided by their parent central bank.
49 Still, episodes like the US savings and loan crisis indicate that good supervision and regulation do not
eliminate the need for a lender of last resort.

"oAnnaJ. Schwartz, Is there a Need for an InternationalLender of Last Resort, The Cato Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1,

Spring/Summer 1999, pp. 1-6.

" Allan H. Meltzer, Asian Problems and the IMF The CATO Journal, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1998.
'2 Deepak Lal, Don't Bank on It, Mr Blair, The Spectator, 26 September 1998, pp. 17-19.
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Challenging these assertions, Stanley Fischer, the first deputy-managing director
of the IMF, argues that the Fund's powers must be enhanced so it can function as a
"true international lender of last resort".53 Fischer argues "that the IMF, although it is
not an international central bank, has already undertaken important lender of last resort
functions", such as using its own funds to design financial stabilization programmes and
organizing international rescue packages (including the prevention of panic-induced
declines in the aggregate money supply and contagious spill-overs). While the IMF
lacks the powers of a central bank, and does not have the resources to cover all
potential foreign exchange obligations, it nevertheless has the capacity to act as a lender
to individual countries in specified circumstances. Fischer convincingly argues that the
major function of the lender of last resort in modern economies is that of a "crisis
manager", a role that does not require large amounts of capital. Indeed, "the lender of
last resort need not have the power to create money as long as it can provide credit to
the market or to institutions in trouble".5 4 He correctly notes that "panics caused by a
demand for currency are rare". More generally, panics takes the form of a bank run
(possibly enhanced by contagion), in which deposits shift from those banks and
financial institutions deemed unsound to those thought to be healthy. In these cases,
creating additional money may be unnecessary. At least in principle, the liquidity can
simply re-circulate from the institutions gaining money back to those losing it.
Fischer provocatively adds that more than anything, it is the IMF's inability to act
as a reliable lender of last resort that increases moral hazard and investor volatility. In
this era of globalization, where adjustment occurs rapidly through the capital account,
crises tend to be more systemic and localized. These crises require a lender of last resort
because, although lending may have caused the crises, lending is also required to end
them. Without a body like the IMF, an ad hoc consortium of countries led by the G-7
would have to be pulled together during times of crisis. If past experience is any guide,
this consortium would neither act in a timely manner, nor as effectively as the IMF.
No doubt, leading the consortium would be the leader of last resort, the United States.
The idea that the US act as the world's central banker would hardly be acceptable at
home or abroad. Currently, the IMF is the only institution that can co-ordinate large
and rapid injections of credit when fast-moving global financial panics hit sovereign
nations. Yet, if the IMF is to continue to serve as an informal lender of last resort, its
ability to provide liquidity in times of crisis must be strengthened. The Fund, on its
part, must make certain that its prescribed standards on improving financial disclosure,
supervision and regulation are implemented in both the public and private sectors.
Indeed, the new provision that only countries that meet specified standards will be
eligible to borrow IMF funds under the CCL, provides incentives for countries to
s3 Stanley Fischer, "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort", available via www.imf.org/
external. no/speeches/1999/010399. htm.
54 In theory, the IMF has the means to create unlimited resources through the allocation of special assets,
known as special drawing rights (SDRs). Members could vote it the power to create such liquidity in an
emergency, although they have not done so to date.
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adopt the necessary international standards. Equally important, the IMF must become
more selective in its lending, providing funds only when there is a liquidity crisis, that
is, when private lenders are unwilling to lend. Already, the Fund's lending under the
SRF incorporates Bagehot's classic prescription that crisis lending should be at a
penalty rate. The fact that SRF short-term loans made to Korea, Russia and Brazil
were subject to penalty rates, and the strict but necessary policy conditionality (which
serves as a further element of the penalty), is a welcome sign that the days of moral
hazard-free lunches may soon be over.
V

CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION OR CAPITAL CONTROLS?

Dramatic changes in information and communication technology have
transformed the financial services industry and made highly mobile capital a fact of life.
Today, private capital which flows to emerging markets comprises a wide range of
instruments, including bank deposits, equities, direct investments, corporate bonds and
government securities, among others. In recognition of this, over the past two decades
the IMF has steadfastly promoted the liberalization of cross-border capital flows."5 Just
before the outbreak of the financial crisis in Asia, the Interim Committee of the IMF
(at its semi-annual meeting in April 1997) proposed that the organization's Articles of
Agreement (the basic constitution of international financial relations among the 182
member nations), be amended to include currency convertibility for capital
transactions. This view was reiterated in the following months by senior Fund officials,
including managing director Michel Camdessus, who stated that capital account
5 6
liberalization should become one of the IMF's fundamental objectives.
The Asian countries hardest hit by the crisis had all pursued diverse approaches to
opening up their capital accounts. Indonesia liberalized outflows in the 1980s and
inflows only gradually. In 1989 it eliminated controls on foreign borrowing by banks
(but reintroduced them two years later because of concerns of excessive borrowing).
Indonesia continued, however, to liberalize inflows to corporations, allowing
borrowing for trade finance, sales of securities to non-residents and foreign investment
in the domestic stock market. South Korea took a more gradualist approach. It
liberalized outflows in the early 1980s, and inflows into its securities markets in the
early 1990s. In 1992, for example, non-residents were given limited access to the
Korean stock market, and the types of securities that resident firms could issue abroad
were expanded. Thailand attracted foreign inflows by offering tax incentives to foreign
investors, including the setting up of a special facility in 1992, the Bangkok
International Banking Facility (BIBF), in order to enable domestic banks and financial
'5 Earlier, the maintenance of capital controls was not viewed as inconsistent with the objective of the
elimination of foreign exchange restrictions, partly because capital controls were considered necessary for
supporting the system of fixed exchange rates.
56 Michel Camdessus, "Capital Account Liberalization and the role of the Fund"; text available on
www.imf.org/pubhcations.
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institutions to borrow from abroad to finance local investment projects and allow
foreign investment in Thai securities markets.57 By the mid-1990s, Malaysia was home
to one of the world's most highly capitalized stock and open financial markets. Not
surprisingly, in 1996, almost 60 percent (or US$ 100 billion) of total capital flows to
developing countries went to Asia.5 8
In a dramatic move on 2 September 1998, the Malaysian government abruptly
imposed controls on capital outflows in an effort to stop (to use Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamed's words) "rogue foreign speculators" from trying to destroy the
Malaysian economy. A series of measures were hastily introduced for containing
ringgit speculation and the outflow of capital by eliminating the offshore ringgit
market. Also, a temporary (one-year) prohibition was instituted against repatriation of
earnings by foreign investors on portfolio investments held in the country for less than
one year.5 9 In addition, exporters were required to turn in foreign currency earnings to
the central bank in exchange for ringgit at the new pegged exchange rate (3.80 to the
US dollar), and citizens were prohibited from taking as little as US$ 100 out of the
country, with the law enforced by random searches at the airport and other exit
60
points.
Malaysia's radical policy response to the crisis, besides bringing sharp rebuke from
the Fund and the United States Treasury, also re-ignited an old debate on the
appropriate sequencing of reforms, and specifically, on the appropriate timing for
liberalizing the capital account. No doubt, economic theory has long recognized the
negative effects of exchange and capital controls. By taxing foreign money required to
purchase foreign-made goods and services, exchange controls cut the quantity
imported and/or raise the domestic relative price of imports. Moreover, exchange and
capital controls raise transaction and other trade-related costs, and give rise to negative
market perceptions, which in turn makes it costlier and more difficult for the country
to access foreign funds. Costs associated with international transactions increase because
exchange controls tend to undermine the development of liquid (and efficient) foreign
exchange markets, besides postponing necessary adjustments in policies or hampering
private-sector adaptation of modern financial instruments. Both types of controls foster
evasion and rent-seeking and reduce trade by limiting the transfer of technology,
portfolio diversification, managerial expertise and skills through direct foreign
investment. Moreover, controls on repatriation of profits and dividends discourages

57 In hindsight, the BIBF ended up unintentionally serving as a conduit for local firms to vastly expand their
loans from foreign banks. Much of this money went into the real estate sector, creating over-supply. When these
investments went sour, bad loans proliferated. The worst part was that most of these loans were denominated in
foreign currency, usually with no hedging against currency depreciation. The results were disastrous.
s IMF, World Economic Outlook: 1999, note 10 above.
9 In February 1999, a system of taxes on outflows replaced the prohibition on repatriation of capital.
60 The Malaysian case is quite different from controls on capital inflows as implemented in Chile between
1991 and 1998. Specifically, Chile imposed various restrictions on inflows, including a requirement that a portion
of any money borrowed abroad be deposited for a year at the central bank, without interest. In the case of
Malaysia, on 4 February 1999, the 12-month holding restriction on repatriation of portfolio capital was replaced
with a declining scale of exit levies.
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direct foreign investment, reduces inter-temporal trade and limits domestic business
opportunities. In the presence of capital controls, financial inter-mediation is less
efficient, as savings are not allocated to the most efficient uses and the range of available
financial products and services tends to be narrow and of poorer quality.
Yet, a number of distinguished economists (who on principle are supportive of
the idea of free capital mobility) have, nevertheless, cautioned that controls help limit
volatile short-term capital flows and thereby avoid balance-of-payments crises and limit
exchange rate volatility, as well as providing governments with greater independence
in determining the interest rate policy. In 1978, Nobel laureate James Tobin proposed
"throwing sand in the wheels of short-run capital flows" by imposing a uniform tax
(dubbed the "Tobin tax") on all foreign exchange transactions to reduce the
destabilizing speculation in international financial markets. 61 Similarly, MIT's Rudiger
Dornbusch notes that since financial markets are very liquid and react quickly to
shocks (while the real economy is slow to react due to price and wage rigidities and
investment irreversibility), this "differential speed of adjustment" may induce excess
exchange rate volatility (over-shooting, bubbles, etc.), with negative effects on real
economic activity. Dornbusch proposes the adoption of measures such as dual
exchange rate systems to protect the real economy from the fluctuations in the
financial markets. More recently, angered by the "destruction" caused by the Asian
financial crisis, Columbia University economist Jagdish Bhagwati (an uncompromising
advocate of free trade) accused the "Wall Street-Treasury Department Complex"
(which commands tremendous influence over the IMF and the World Bank) of
preaching the virtues of unfettered capital flows without highlighting the costs
associated with "the inherently crisis-prone nature of freer capital movements". He
noted in particular, that a large influx of capital can lead to over-capacity and
speculative bubbles. Bhagwati notes that there is a "difference between trade in
widgets and dollars ...many assumed that free capital mobility among all nations was
exactly like free trade in their goods and services ...that the gains might be
problematic because of the costs of crises was not considered ...[and it is this] original
version of the myth which has steadily propelled the IMF into its complacent and
dangerous moves toward the goal of capital account convertibility". 62 While Bhagwati
cautions that countries should "not jump to capital controls", he notes that "it has
become apparent that crises attendant on capital mobility cannot be ignored". His
advice includes:
"For many developing countries today, including India and China, the question is not whether
to impose capital controls but whether to drop them. To them, I say: Cease moving towards
free capital flows until you have political stability, sustained prosperity and substantial
61 The Tobin tax would be a small percentage levy (in the order of about 0.1 to 0.5 percent) on all foreign
exchange transactions. Tobin argued that such a tax would greatly lessen the profit margins on short-term
currency trading (so called "round-tripping"), while having minimal effects on the returns to long-term
international investments. For details, see James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, (1978) 4
Eastern Economic Journal 153.
62 Jagdish

Bhagwati, The Capital Myth, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 3, May/June 1998, pp. 7-12.
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macroeconomic expertise. Concentrate instead on internal reforms such as privatization and
external reforms such as freer trade. Allow 'targeted' convertibility for dividends, profits and
invested capital for direct foreign investment. It brings capital and skills and is more stable than
short-term capital flows. For the countries that had already freed capital flows substantially and
are currently afflicted
by panic-driven outflows, my advice is the opposite: Do not jump into
63
capital controls.
On 28 September 1998 (just three days before Malaysia imposed controls) the
iconoclastic MIT economist, Paul Krugman posted on his webpage a provocative
article justifying the use of controls on capital outflows to combat speculative attacks.
While some viewed Krugman's piece as providing intellectual cover for Malaysia's use
of controls, Krugman clarified his position a week later in an article aptly titled,
"Saving Asia: It's Time to Get Radical". 64 He argued that since earlier prescriptions, in
particular, protecting the currency through sharp rises in interest rates ("the IMF
model"), or allowing a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate (advocated by Sachs
and others), have not worked, "temporary controls on capital" is the least bad choice,
if not the only choice, left to a country desperately trying to halt a financial meltdown.
To Krugman such temporary and "curative" controls should be dismantled once
the economy recovers. A host of other distinguished analysts have echoed similar
sentiments. Harvard's Dani Rodrik issued an indictment of the IMF's push for
unconditional capital market liberalization, arguing that since asymmetric information
problems are endemic to financial markets it is time for "the IMF to accept temporary
capital controls in the countries that are otherwise following its recipes, so that they,
too, can revive their economies". 65 Princeton University's Alan Blinder (also a former
vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve), suggested that emerging economies should not
"rush to open capital markets [since] unfettered international financial mobility is not
the best system for all countries".66 Berkeley's Barry Eichengreen advocated Chileanstyle controls on capital inflows to stop the "boom and bust" cycles associated with
volatile short-term capital flows, and Joseph Stiglitz, the World Bank's Chief
Economist, noted that "volatile markets are an inescapable reality. Developing
countries need to manage them. They will have to consider policies that help stabilize
the economy ...These could include sound bankruptcy laws and Chilean-style
'67
policies that put some limits on capital flows."
It is difficult to gauge to what extent (if any) these criticisms and suggestions
forced the IMF to re-evaluate its policies on capital liberalization and capital controls.
63

Jagdish Bhagwati, Yes to Free Trade, Maybe to Capital Controls, The Wall Street Journal, 16 November 1998,

p. A-38.

64 Paul Krugman, Saving Asia: It's Time to Get Radical, Fortune, 7 September 1998, pp. 74-80. In a later
article he argued that "sooner or later we will have to turn the clock at least part of the way back to limit capital
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Based on my interviews with senior Fund officials, two broad perspectives can be
discerned. To some, full financial liberalization is still the least bad alternative, because
imposing capital controls and limiting capital mobility is no solution to the structural
problems underlying many emerging economies. Hence there should not be any
retreat from current levels of capital account liberalization and that, if there is, then the
Fund should have authority to approve it in advance. Also, some correctly pointed out
that the restoration of capital inflows will be crucial in ensuring an early recovery. After
all, one reason why Mexico recovered so quickly from the peso crisis was the large
foreign investor participation in its export sector. Moreover, capital controls may
insulate economies, thereby eroding the incentive to reform. However, others believe
in a more gradualist approach. They argue that in order to compensate for financial
market imperfections and the reality that adequate domestic regulation in emerging
markets will take many years at best, some controls on volatile short-term capital could
be permitted to allow "some temporary breathing space in which to adopt and
implement sound economic policies and reforms". 68 They add that the Fund should
allow for a transitional arrangement during which countries would be urged (via a
carrot and stick approach) to take concrete steps to strengthen their banking and
financial systems. The Fund now appears to favour sequenced capital account
liberalization so that long-term flows (such as FDI and term loans) are favoured over
short-term equity flows. Also, the IMF's position of control on capital inflows is
neutral, but it remains opposed to controls on outflows. The fund is quick to point out
that this policy flexibility "in no way negates the IMF's position that free capital flows
are good for everyone in the long run". 69 The new policy position is summed up by
deputy-managing director Stanley Fischer:
"Malaysia's decision to impose controls on capital outflows-and support for the idea among
some academics raises the question of whether such controls will once again become
widespread. The IMF's position has long been that capital account liberalization should proceed

in an orderly way: countries should lift controls on outflows only gradually as the balance of
payments strengthens; liberalization of inflows should start at the long end and move to the
short end only as banking and financial systems are strengthened. We have not opposed
Chilean-style, market-based measures to regulate capital inflows at70the short end, but they must
be considered case-by-case (Chile has recently eased its controls)."

The Fund's policy position means neither a return to pervasive capital controls
nor a rush towards unconditional capital liberalization. Rather, it adopts a prudent
policy that recognizes that controls over inflows, particularly those designed to
influence their composition, might be justified, but only in countries with
appropriate prudential policies. An important lesson of the Asian financial crisis is that
capital market liberalization must be undertaken with care. The problem in Asia was
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not that they liberalized their capital accounts but that the sequencing was wrong and
that liberalization was only partial. Most of these countries liberalized short-term
capital inflows before foreign direct investment, when they should have done it the
other way around. Also, if the domestic financial systems are weak, poorly regulated
and subject to institutional distortions, rapid capital account liberalization can lead to
excessive short-term borrowing and lending and a build-up of excessive debt
burdens, quickly turning liquidity problems into solvency problems. Hence, an
orderly and sequenced liberalization until the requisite regulatory institutions are in
place is critical. Seen in this context, the Malaysian controls have been a missed
opportunity. Rather than utilizing the so-called "breathing space" to make
fundamental reforms to its fragile and highly leveraged financial sector, the Malaysian
government has done the opposite. Prime Minister Mahathir, besides sacking
reform-oriented policy-makers (such as Anwar Ibrahim), has followed policies,
including further loosening of non-performing loan classification regulation and the
setting of minimum lending targets for banks, that will only serve to exacerbate the
underlying structural problems.
While the Fund has appropriately criticized the Malaysian controls, its
admittedly neutral stance towards the Chilean controls on capital inflows should not
be seen as an endorsement of that approach. As noted earlier, the Chilean controls,
or the encaje, in effect between May 1992 and May 1998, required anyone
borrowing abroad to pay a premium of between 20 and 30 percent of the loan which
was to be held at the central bank without interest, for one year. The penalty rate for
early withdrawal was 3 percent. The rationale for the Chilean tax was threefold: (1)
to prevent overvaluation of the peso, which would have negatively affected the
country's export-oriented growth; (2) to encourage more long-term capital inflows
for developmental purposes; and (3) to discourage residents from relying too heavily
on short-term borrowing, thereby reducing the problem of maturity mismatch (that
is heavy short-term borrowing and long-term lending). When short-term flows
dried up in 1998, the premium was reduced to zero. However, what is important to
note is that Chile's unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on most capital
flows was a market-based and non-discriminatory form of capital control with many
desirable macroeconomic effects. Therefore, the Chilean controls worked because
they were comprehensive and an integral part of broader macroeconomic reforms.
Specifically, the Chilean authorities closed all possible loopholes, even to the extent
that domestic banks were prevented from writing offshore derivative swap contracts
with foreign holders of long-term Chilean debt. Most importantly, Chile could do
this because of its strong macroeconomic fundamentals. Its regulation of the financial
sector is well developed. It has in place a modern system of prudential banking
regulation, effective loan recovery mechanisms and high transparency, disclosure and
accountability standards, and a strong and autonomous central bank. Suffice it to
note, these preconditions are sadly absent in most emerging economies.
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VI.

EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES

Countries can choose from among three basic regimes in linking their economies
to the international system. (1) They can have a flexible or "floating" exchange rate
where governments let their currency float freely in the exchange markets against all
other currencies. Even when the exchange rate is flexible in this sense, the government
may (usually through the central bank) buy foreign exchange to push up the value of
the foreign currency and depreciate the home currency, or sell foreign exchange to
push down its value and appreciate the home currency in order to smooth short-term
fluctuations in demand and supply, and thus in short-term exchange-rate changes.
Such intervention is referred to as a "dirty float", while the "managed float" means the
absence of a specific target for the exchange rate. (2) They can have an intermediate
regime or "pegged exchange rate" that can be adjusted or changed through such
mechanisms as "adjustable peg" (or fixing the exchange rate, but without any openended commitment, to resist devaluation or revaluation in the presence of a large
balance of payments deficit or surplus), or pursuant to some pre-determined parameters
such as "target zones" (a margin of fluctuation around some central rate) or "crawling
bands" (a pre-announced policy of devaluing a bit each week) and other hybrid
systems. (3) Countries may also choose a rigidly fixed exchange rate where
governments can fix the price of their currency against a specific foreign currency or a
basket of foreign currencies. Fixed rates can be managed by currency boards. Unlike a
central bank, a currency board issues funds that are fully backed (100 percent) by
reserves of hard currency like the US dollar, whereby the domestic currency is freely
convertible into hard currency. The exchange rate is fixed by law, not just by a
currency market intervention, and monetary policy is targeted strictly on maintaining
balance of payments equilibrium with the fixed exchange rate. An extreme form of a
fixed exchange rate is the abandonment of a national currency and the adoption of a
powerful foreign currency such as the US dollar for domestic use-hence, the term
"dollarization". A country that has official dollarization (such as Panama), besides
adopting the US dollar as legal tender, has also eliminated the monetary policy-making
role of its central bank. Without a national currency to manage, the country's
monetary policy, is in effect, put into the hands of the United States Federal Reserve.71
The choice has important consequences for an economy, since the exchange rate
is one of the most important price signals. While all three regimes have their strengths
and weaknesses, an important lesson of the financial crises of the 1990s is that the fixed
but adjustable exchange rate pegs tend to crumble too easily under speculative attacks.
Specifically, although adhering to a pegged exchange rate regime can be a successful
strategy for controlling inflation, it also has fatal flaws. As Mishkin notes, "under a
71 Limited dollarization occurs when US dollars circulate alongside a country's national currency. In this
arrangement, the domestic currency continues to serve to some degree as a medium of exchange, store of value
and unit of account. Limited dollarization exists in many countries throughout the world, notably in Latin
America.
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pegged exchange rate regime, when a successful speculative attack occurs, the decline
in the value of the domestic currency is usually larger, more rapid and more
unanticipated than when a depreciation occurs under a floating exchange rate
regime". 72 In the recent financial crises involving Mexico, Asia, Russia and Brazil, the
defence of an exchange rate pegged at untenable levels was at the heart of the problem.
Moreover, the worst hit country, Indonesia, saw its currency decline to less than onequarter of its pre-crisis value in a matter of weeks. Why don't pegs work as well as they
used to, and why don't countries abandon them? Most analysts agree that financial
globalization and high capital mobility have rendered the operation of intermediate
arrangements (in particular, the adjustable peg regime) problematic because rapid flows
of large and liquid international capital markets make its exceedingly difficult for
authorities to support a peg. Even the most competent central bank finds it difficult to
know when to abandon the defence of its currency, or when to call the speculators'
bluff. In any case, both strategies carry enormous costs. As Eichengreen aptly notes,
"pegged rates create one-way bets for speculators, making sitting ducks of
the central
73
banks and governments seeking to operate them".
What should be done next? It seems that there are two credible choices left: a
country can either let its exchange rate float freely or adopt a truly fixed arrangement.
However, what is appropriate is difficult to say, because no single currency regime is
right for all countries or at all times. Suffice it to note that both options have their pros
and cons. While floating rates allow a country to pursue an independent monetary
policy, they nevertheless remain at the mercy of the markets. Rapid capital movements
can quickly overwhelm emerging markets with limited absorptive capacities. Floating
rates can be subject to sharp fluctuations, forcing currencies to "overshoot" the
economic fundamentals-thereby pushing a currency far below its underlying
economic value-leaving rising inflation, trade deficits, and eroding export
competitiveness in its wake. On the other hand, a fixed rate can provide a useful
anchor for price stability by linking weak and emerging economies to the large,
powerful economies, including reductions in the transaction costs of international trade
and investment. However, private capital flows can overwhelm, forcing costly
devaluations and re-valuations. A "successful" defence of a fixed rate can often be
costly, requiring a country to raise interest rates and/or slow its economy to avoid
speculative attacks. The experiences of Hong Kong and Argentina illustrate that even
the currency board arrangements are not free from speculative attacks or banking
collapse. Currency board pressures in both these countries (especially Argentina) has
extracted very high costs in terms of economic growth. While total dollarization
almost eliminates the possibility of a currency devaluation and transaction costs
associated with international trade and finance with the United States, dollarized
economies face similar problems associated with currency board systems. Besides losing
72 F.S.
Mishkin, "Lessons from the Asian Crisis", NBER Working Paper Series, No. 7102, p. 19.

3 Eichengreen, Towards a New InternationalArchitecture, see note 36 above, p. 104.
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several important policy instruments over policy (for example, no domestic institution
74
can act as the lender of last resort), there is also complete loss of seigniorage.
Moreover, dollarization may be feasible only for small, open economies highly
vulnerable to international shocks, and with strong international trade and financial ties
to the United States.7 Finally, a dollarized economy with a weak banking system may
not be able to efficiently channel the capital inflow that inevitably accompanies
dollarization, leading to unsustainable lending booms and financial dis-intermediation.
The IMF does not have an official position on its member countries' exchange
rate regimes, maintaining that it sees advantages in both fixed and flexible
exchange rate systems, depending on a country's economic circumstances. However, if
the IMF is to play an important role in shaping the new international financial
architecture and build a financial and monetary system with fewer vulnerabilities, it
will have to effectively guide countries in adopting exchange rate regimes that are right
for them.

74 Seigniorage is the revenue (or the profit) a country earns by issuing currency. For example, when the US
Federal Reserve issues dollars it buys US Treasury securities in exchange. So when the Treasury makes payments
on these securities they go to the Federal Reserve. In turn, the Federal Reserve uses a small portion of these
payments to help finance its operations and sends the rest back to the Treasury Department.
7s Both the US Federal Reserve and the Treasury have stated that the policies of the United States will not
be altered to adapt to the economic considerations of countries that choose to dollarize. So foreign governments
considering full dollarization must do so with the understanding that US monetary policy will remain focused on
domestic issues.
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